Talk Turkey

Local label finds favor on international fashion scene

Mavi Jeans are perceived in the U.S. as a high-quality brand.

AVI IS ONE OF Turkey’s few international brand names to have made its mark in a highly competitive environment where tastes are constantly changing – the fashion world. In particular, it has overtaken sales in Turkey of the all-American brand, Levi.
Mavi Jeans, produced in Turkey, have also gained a significant share of the U.S. market – particularly since the likes of Cher, Chelsea Clinton and MTV DJs have been spotted wearing them. Today, Mavi makes about 13 million pairs of jeans a year at its two factories in Turkey.

Its Cerkezkoy plant, about an hour’s drive from Istanbul, is the largest blue jeans factory in Turkey. Built on 25 acres of land, the factory has a covered area of more than 269,000 square feet and jeans are produced to international standards, using the latest American, German and Japanese technologies.
Mavi – the name means ‘blue’ in Turkish – now sells jeans throughout the world, from North Africa to Europe and from the Middle East to the Americas. Mavi will be opening its first international flagship stores in New York City and Vancouver this fall. It has showrooms in New York, Los Angeles, Dallas, Vancouver, Montreal, London, Frankfurt, Copenhagen, and most recently, Sydney. Worldwide sales exceed $200 million.

The fit is the most important element and the starting point for Mavi
Ersin Akarlilar

The founder of Mavi Jeans, Sait Akarlilar, established his textiles business in 1971. In 1984 he turned to jeans production for big brand names such as Calvin Klein and founded the ERAK company. In 1991 he created his own brand, Mavi Jeans.
Ersin Akarlilar, the son of the founder and President of Mavi U.S., says: “In Turkey, everyone knows and takes pride in the fact that Mavi Jeans are Turkish. Since denim is universal, it has not consciously been a part of our overseas strategy to say that Mavi is a Turkish product.
“In the U.S. teen market, where your brand is from isn’t as important as quality and fit.
“A pair of jeans might be the latest fashion, but if the fit isn’t right, you won’t buy them. So fit is the most important element and the starting point for Mavi.”

Turkey's Muslim Identity did not Prevent Turkey's Intense Relations with Europe by Abdullah Gul Turkish Foreign Minister

Now that the European Commission has declared its favourable recommendation,

there is every reason to expect the European Council, in line with its earlier commitment, to decide to open accession negotiations with Turkey "without delay" when it meets in Brussels on 17 December Turkey has reached this point through a nation-wide effort, which reflects the underlying philosophy of the Republic and the democratic aspirations of the Turkish people and their determination to reach the highest contemporary political, economic and social standards. The overwhelming public support that Turkey's reform process enjoys within Turkey is telling in this respect. The growth of civil society has been especially instrumental in expediting Turkey's reform process. This strong consensus is also important for the adoption and implementation of volumes of EU legislation - acquis communautaire - required for Turkey's eventual membership. Having invested so much in this process of integration with the EU, the Turkish people merely expect to be treated fairly and equally as was foreseen for all candidates. As Turkey has advanced in its accession process to the EU in the past two years, the issue of Turkey's membership has received much international attention. The reasons are obvious: First, Turkey's geopolitical position has a direct bearing on the European Union's strategic vision and the international role it foresees for itself. Secondly, the comprehensive reform process taking place in Turkey, which has been followed closely by foreign audiences and experts, has a significance of its own. Turkey's performance regarding reforms has been impressive. The logical next step in Turkey-EU relations - opening of the accessions negotiations -will have positive reverberations in a wider geography. As the December deadline approaches, hesitations, second thoughts, but also misrepresentations and even prejudices on the part of some have resurfaced. We have taken these seriously and tried to make our case as clear as possible. It has to be said that Turkish membership presents a challenge to the EU due to Turkey's size. Turkey's relative economic weakness and large population are cited by some as disadvantages. Yet, the opposite argument has more clout. Economics and demography do not lend themselves to misrepresentation if properly analyzed. The potential of Turkey's vibrant economy, its entrepreneurial strength and the expected levels of growth are promising. The present positive trend in the economy and the economic reforms that complement the political reforms are positive signs. As for demographic trends, the Turkish population is expected to stabilize around 85 million by 2025, far from exceeding the 100 million as some would like the European public to believe. With the expected increase in foreign investments in Turkey following the start of accession negotiations, domestic demand for labor is likely to diminish the willingness of Turks migrating to Europe en masse in search of jobs. More importantly, given the worrying demographic trends in Europe (falling birth rates and even decreases in population in some cases) over the next few decades, the young population of Turkey can be viewed as an asset rather than a hypothetical liability for the EU, as mentioned by several independent reports and the impact assessment study conducted by the Commission. The European Union has a strategic objective to extend its security and stability through building "consensus", as opposed to relying on coercion. Turkish membership will be a proof of EU's capacity to generate harmony by extending the European space of peace on the basis of common goals and shared values. In this respect, Turkey's membership will give substance to the European idea that diversity is richness and that unity in diversity is desirable. I believe that, at a time when prophecies about a clash of civilizations can still make headlines, the European Union stands to gain much from Turkey's eventual membership. The Muslim identity of the Turkish population has not prevented it from interacting intensely with the West in general and Europe in particular, or from becoming an effective member of European institutions and organizations. Indeed, the successful conclusion of Turkey's accession process to the EU will represent the harmonization of a predominantly Moslem society with the peoples of Europe on the basis of common universal and democratic values. This will on the one hand facilitate the better integration of the millions of Muslims living in Europe within their host societies, and on the other hand, demonstrate to the Muslim world that Europe, by gathering around shared values, is serious about overcoming the prejudices that form time to time surface concerning Muslim societies. Turkey is working to establish a culture of reconciliation as the basic working ethic among countries in its region. This is evidenced by the positive trend that Turkey's relations with its neighbors reflect for the last decade and more so recently. As Turkey advances towards EU membership, the credibility and effectiveness of its voice calling for modernization and democratic reform in its region will increase. Turkey-EU relations have a contractual background going back 41 years. We have every reason to expect that, EU leaders will observe this contractual framework and act with foresight and political courage on 17 December. In fact, almost all EU leaders have expressed favourable views regarding the opening of negotiations. The visionary approach that European leaders are expected to deliver will have political, strategic, economic and cultural reverberations on Europe's perception of itself and on its relations with adjacent areas and beyond.

Turkey at the Crossroads

Extremist attacks highlight major paradoxes in Turkish polity

Mohammed Ayoob

YaleGlobal, 22 January 2004

	Faithfuls in a Turkish mosque: The ruling party took the risk of alienating its Islamic base by offering to deploy troops against fellow Sunni Muslims in Iraq.

EAST LANSING: The bombs that exploded in Turkey in November have not only shaken the oldest secular Muslim country, they have also raised grave questions about Turkey's future and its membership in the European Union. Moreover, current politics reveal a new paradox: an Islamic party seeking close ties with the European Union and supporting Turkish troop deployments in Iraq as opposed to the traditionally pro-American military and the secularist, Kemalist political party increasingly lukewarm on both issues.

To understand the Turkish paradox, and the context in which extremist Islamic elements have mounted the attacks, one has to look at recent dramatic shifts in Turkish politics brought about by the rise of an Islam-based but highly pragmatic Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the gradual decline of the military's influence. The AKP's record in office makes clear that it is firmly committed to rooting out religious extremism, bringing Turkey into the EU fold, and developing close relations with the United States. The AKP demonstrated its commitment to the latter objective when in March 2003 it tried to get the Turkish Parliament to allow US troop deployment through Turkey into northern Iraq. That attempt failed, partly because of the government's inexperience and partly because of strong popular sentiment against such deployment. However, the AKP more than made up for this fiasco when it pushed through a resolution in Parliament in October sanctioning Turkish troop deployment in Iraq to help keep order in the volatile Sunni triangle. This initiative was aborted when Washington had second thoughts in light of opposition from the Iraqi Governing Council.

It is interesting to note, in the context of the AKP's pro-West stance, that the secular Turkish military establishment may have been responsible at one time for aiding and abetting the shadowy Islamist organization whose offshoots bombed Istanbul in November. The story is rather murky. Yet there seems to be a consensus amongst Turkish analysts that the “jihadi” elements that committed the heinous acts were connected to or descended from the Turkish Hezbollah (not linked to its Lebanese namesake). This group had been armed and trained by the Turkish “deep state” – the code word in Turkey for the security establishment – to fight the Kurdish insurgency during the 1980s and the 1990s.

The Hezbollah originated in southeastern Turkey, the poorest part of the country, in the 1980s and spread its tentacles to the major urban centers farther west where it fought running battles with leftist political factions. Southeastern Turkey is also the area where the Kurdish population is concentrated and where the Marxist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) was waging its secessionist insurgency against the Turkish state during the same period. The strongly Islamist Hezbollah, presumably drawn largely from ethnic Turks, was ideologically and politically opposed to the PKK's Marxist and separatist agenda.

During the 1980s and 1990s, Hezbollah adherents, armed and trained by the military, and acting as vigilantes and death squads, were responsible for killing as many as 500 PKK cadres and members of the Kurdish intelligentsia. However, with the winding down of the Kurdish insurgency and the capture of its leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, the PKK threat has all but evaporated in the predominantly Kurdish areas in southeastern Turkey. This has meant that armed Islamist cadres were left without a job to do and were subsequently targeted by security agencies. Consequently, they have reverted to their original extremist agenda and have turned against the establishment that had fostered them earlier. In this sense, the Turkish Hezbollah bear an uncanny resemblance to the CIA-created and supported mujahedin in Afghanistan who were left without a cause after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The former have come to haunt the Turkish secular establishment just as the latter came to haunt the American establishment.

Turkey's paradox does not end there. Many thought that once in power, the AKP would indulge in identity politics to please its staunchly religious support base. The result would be if not outright opposition to entry into the EU, at least a very lukewarm attitude toward it. If anything, the AKP's posture has turned out to be exactly the opposite. The AKP has enthusiastically advocated Turkey's entry into the EU. Party leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited major EU capitals immediately after the party's victory in the November 2002 elections in order to drum up support for Turkey's membership. On the other hand, it is the secular military that has become increasingly lukewarm toward EU membership.

It is not difficult to understand what lies beneath this paradox. The prospect of membership in the EU, which insists on civilian control of the military, ensures that the Turkish military will be forced to fade from the political scene. Furthermore, implementing EU human rights criteria, a precondition for membership, would ensure that the security apparatus – the “deep state”– would be unable to coerce political elements it does not like. It is thus not surprising that the military – traditionally the most secular element in Turkish society and considered to be pro-EU – has become lukewarm toward EU membership, and increasingly “nationalist” (read anti-European) in its tone.

A final paradox that needs explanation is the AKP's attempt to appease the US in the context of the war against Iraq, which was and continues to be widely unpopular in Turkey. Not only did the staunchly secular, Kemalist Republican People's Party (CHP) vote against US troop deployment in March, the military leadership, usually vocal on matters of national security, maintained a studied silence. Similarly, in October it was the AKP government that pushed through the deployment of Turkish troops into Iraq with the CHP lukewarm about it, and the military maintaining, very uncharacteristically,that this decision be better left to the political leadership.

The AKP government risked alienating its Islamic base by deploying troops against fellow Sunni Muslims based on a rational cost-benefit analysis. It calculated that having the US on its side would lead to several gains. First, economic benefits would accrue, including IMF loans. Second, as a quid pro quo, the US would be willing to use its influence on EU members to accelerate the process of Turkish admission. Third, and above all, it would deter the Turkish military, which values its links with the Pentagon and depends on the US for weaponry and training, from creating a constitutional crisis as it had done in 1997 when it forced the Welfare Party – AKP's Islamic predecessor – from power.

These apparent paradoxes should not be viewed as signs of Turkey's political immaturity. They are evidence of the AKP's intelligent reading and deft handling of the political situation in the country. Thus they contribute not only to securing the party's position in the polity but also consolidating democracy in Turkey.

Mohammed Ayoob is University Distinguished Professor of International Relations, James Madison College, Michigan State University. He was Visiting Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, during Fall 2003.